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Behavioral/Systems/Cognitive
A New Role for the Parahippocampal Cortex in Representing
Space
Sine´ad L. Mullally and Eleanor A. Maguire
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, LondonWC1N 3BG, United Kingdom
The debate surrounding the function of the human posterior parahippocampal cortex (PHC) is currently dominated by two competing
theories. The spatial layout hypothesis proposes that PHC processes information about the shape of space embodied in layout-defining
scene features. The contextual association hypothesis rejects this notion, proposing instead that PHC responds to highly contextualized,
but not necessarily spatial, stimuli. Here we present a novel concept that suggests PHC is primarily concerned with any representation
that depicts three-dimensional local space, be it scenes or even single objects. Specifically, we identified space-defining (SD) and space-
ambiguous (SA) single objects,where SDobjects consistently evoke a strong senseof the surrounding spacewhile SAobjects donot, in the
absenceof anybackground, spatial layout, or context.We found that participants could easily identify anddistinguishbetweenSDandSA
objects. This distinction was subsequently affirmed at a neural level, where visualizing or viewing single SD objects compared with SA
objects engaged PHC, despite these single SD objects offering no information about the shape or layout of the space. Moreover, this PHC
response was robust and not accounted for by other factors, including contextual associations. Instead, it was linked to intrinsic object
properties, specifically a combination of perceived object size and portability. By showing that PHC is responsive to the awareness of
surrounding local space suggests its role in scene processing is basic and fundamental, such that it is not dependent on complex scene
properties such as geometric structure, scene schema, or contextual associations.
Introduction
The posterior parahippocampal cortex (PHC) plays a role in a
range of cognitive functions, including episodic memory, plan-
ning for the future, and spatial navigation (Spreng et al., 2009),
but the precise function of this region is still debated. One prom-
inent theory, the spatial layout hypothesis, proposes that PHC
responds to the geometric structure of scenes embodied in
layout-defining features such as walls and other immovable to-
pographical elements (Epstein, 2008; Epstein and Ward, 2010).
In this framework it is posited that scenes have special qualities
over and above that of single objects, although these unique fea-
tures remain ill defined (Epstein, 2008), and this ambiguity pres-
ents a problem for the spatial layout hypothesis.
Scenes are typically defined by the presence of multiple
elements that exist in relationship to each other, resulting in a
defined space (Biederman et al., 1982; Henderson andHolling-
worth, 1999). The implication is that an awareness of the three-
dimensional (3D) space arises from the presence and arrangement
of these elements.However, we suggest that a person’s experience of
3D space can exist without the presence of multiple objects, large
scale structures, or a scene, and it is this basic sense of space that
concerns the PHC. If this is true, then the spatial layout hypothesis
would need to be extended to include the subjective experience of
space evenwhen evokedby single objects that are perceivedor imag-
ined in isolation, that is, devoid of a spatial layout or context.
To test this hypothesis, we identified a range of single objects
that consistently evoked a strong sense of the surrounding space
[space-defining (SD) objects] and other objects that had no such
effect [space-ambiguous (SA) objects]. We assessed the validity
of this novel SD/SA concept in a series of behavioral studies,
followed by two functional MRI (fMRI) experiments. We hy-
pothesized that the PHCwould selectively respond to SD relative
to SA objects. Such an observation would be contrary to previous
studies that report minimal activation in PHC in response to
discrete objects (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998; Epstein et al.,
1999) andwould support the concept of the PHCas a basic space-
specific, as opposed to a scene-specific or place-specific, region.
A conflicting account of PHC function is the contextual asso-
ciation (CA) hypothesis, which suggests that the PHC is not spe-
cifically concerned with space, place, or scene processing but
instead mediates the coactivation of associated representations
(Bar and Aminoff, 2003; Bar, 2004). We considered whether en-
gagement of the PHC could be accounted for by object contex-
tualization. Thus, as well as investigating SD/SA objects, the
stimuli were also characterized using Bar and Aminoff’s (2003)
CA criteria, and the neural response to this was assessed. While
the CA hypothesis would predict increased activation of PHC for
highly contextualized objects compared to objects only weakly
associated with a specific context, we instead predicted greater
activation of PHC for SD compared with SA objects, regardless
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of how strongly or weakly they were associated with a specific
context.
Materials andMethods
There were three aspects to this study; first, a set of behavioral studies
aimed at characterizing single objects along a range parameters. This was
followed by an fMRI study and finally by another auxiliary fMRI study.
The methods for each phase will now be described in turn.
Behavioral experiments
Participants. Fifty-one healthy, right-handed, native English speakers [29
females; mean age 25.62 years, standard deviation (StD) 3.53] partici-
pated in a series of five experiments (n 10 per experiment). All had
normal or corrected to normal vision and gave informedwritten consent
in accordance with the local research ethics committee.
Stimuli and procedure. Descriptions of single objects were provided
and participants had to imagine the objects based on these descriptions.
This “imagination” method enabled us to more directly manipulate the
cognitive process of interest, i.e., the internal representation of 3D space,
by using stimuli that explicitly required participants to represent each
stimulus as a 3D object within their mind’s eye. However, to ensure that
this imagination approach did not bias our findings, we also conducted
parallel experiments where participants viewed pictures of single objects
(see below, Auxiliary fMRI experiment).
We beganwith a pool of 399 everyday objects typically foundwithin an
indoor environment. Each object was accompanied by one or two de-
scriptors (e.g., colors, patterns, material) to ensure its distinctiveness.
During a training phase, participants were introduced to the concept of
space-defining and space-ambiguous objects. It was suggested that cer-
tain objects, when imagined in isolation, evoke a strong sense of sur-
rounding space (SD objects), while others do not (SA objects). Once it
was clear the concept was understood and the importance of imagining
the objects in isolation against a blank background was strongly empha-
sized, participants were presented with typed descriptions of each object
(e.g., “a flowery cushioned sofa”) and had to imagine the object in ques-
tion as vividly as possible. Each object was imagined one at a time, with-
out any surrounding objects or background contexts, and was then rated
by the participant as either “space defining” or “space ambiguous.” It was
evident that participants were clearly and consistently able to distinguish
between SD and SA objects. Objects rated as SD were assigned a score of
1, while objects rated as SA were given a score of 0. Those that could not
be easily classified were assigned a score of 0.5. Each object’s cumulative
score across participants was calculated and divided by the total number
of participants (and multiplied by 100). Thus, if all participants rated an
object as SD, it yielded a score of 100, while an object rated as SA by all
participants yielded a score of 0 [i.e., 100% of participants rated the
object as SA (0) and therefore not as SD (1)]. Using this SD/SA
continuum, objects consistently categorized as either SD (65%) or
SA (35%) were identified. After all objects had been rated in this way,
participants were debriefed, i.e., participants were asked to describe the
difference between an SD and an SA object and reflect on how the expe-
rience of imagining an SD object differed from the experience of imag-
ining an SA object. Typical responses included: “SD items conjure up a
sense of space whereas SA items float—they go anywhere.” It is impor-
tant to note that when participants used words such a “space” or “posi-
tion” they were further probed to ensure that they were referring not to
full or partial scenes, contexts, or places, but to space as a three-
dimensional but unspecific construct. Significantly,many spontaneously
used the word “float” when discussing SA objects, emphasizing the de-
tachment of these objects from an explicit sense of surrounding space.
Next, the rating procedure was repeated, with participants now rating
each object in terms of its size (i.e., was the specific object considered to
be very small, small, medium, large, or very large). Size judgments were
based solely on the participants’ impression of each individual item’s size
and not relative to the other objects considered in the session. A number
between 1 and 5 was then assigned to participants’ size categorizations
(i.e., “very small”  1, “very large”  5), and an average size rating
(across participants) calculated for each object.
The primary purpose of phase one was to assemble a set of 250 objects
for use in the subsequent fMRI experiment. Thus, 250 of the original 399
objects were selected—those that were most consistently rated as SD
across subjects and those rated as consistently SA, while also ensuring, as
far as possible, that the SD and SA object sets were similar in terms of
their descriptors (i.e., colors, patterns, material) and size. This set of
objects comprised 112 SD objects (e.g., “a large oak bed,” “a dark cordu-
roy couch,” “an antique rocking horse”), 125 SA objects (e.g., “a large
cardboard box,” “a small white fan heater,” “a wicker laundry basket”),
and 13 objects that fell between the two categories (the latter included to
facilitate linear parametric analyses).
Having established the SD/SA nature and the perceived size of these
250 objects, in the final set of behavioral studies, these objects were rated
on a five-point scale across a range of other parameters, in particular to
characterize them in terms of context. Specifically, participants rated
how difficult it was to imagine an object in isolation (1  very
easy . . . 5 very difficult). Next they were asked to list any other objects
which came tomindwhen the object was visualized (i.e., object-to-object
associations). Items which consistently evoked thoughts of an associated
object(s), were noted and a percentage score across participants was
calculated. Finally, participants were asked to rate how often they would
expect the object’s position in a room to change in everyday life (1 
often . . . 5 rarely), yielding an object ‘portability’ score. Theywere also
asked to name the place they most strongly associated the object with
(i.e., object-to-context associations, using the method of Bar and Amin-
off, 2003). As with the SD/SA ratings, each object’s cumulative score
across participants was calculated and divided by the total number of
participants (and multiplied by 100). Thus, if all participants listed the
same associated context, it yielded a score of 100 (and was considered to
be highly contextualized), while if only half of the participants listed one
particular context, that object yielded a score of 50. To classify the objects
into two groups (i.e., a highly contextualized group and a weakly contex-
tualized group), we calculated the median score for the 250 objects (me-
dian 56).We thus considered objects with a score of 62 and above to be
highly contextualized (n 114; mean score, 82.63; StD, 10.91) and ob-
jects with a score of 50 and below to be weakly contextualized (n  95;
mean score, 36.14; StD, 8.57). Following this, participants were asked
whether it was possible to imagine the place they associated with an
object without that object being present (i.e., expected presence, 1 no,
not often . . . 5  always). This yielded a measure of how critical each
object was to its associated context.
The mean scores on each object measure (and comparisons between
SD and SA objects) are shown in Table 1). Overall, SD objects were
significantly larger than SA objects (t(235) 20.04, p 0.001). Interest-
ingly, there was some size overlap between SD and SA objects in the
medium size category, suggesting that participants did not make SD/SA
decisions based on size alone. Object portability, a measure of how often
participants would expect an item’s position to change in a room in
everyday life, differed significantly between the SD and SA objects (t(235)
15.27, p 0.001), with SD objects being generally less portable than SA
objects. Despite this overall difference, however, a considerable number
of SA objects were also considered to have low portability (portability
score 4; n 25). This shows that participants did not make the SD/SA
decision solely on the basis of object portability. Thus, the behavioral
studies resulted in a set of objects that were characterized along a range of
parameters: SD/SA, size, portability, object-to-context associations
(places most associated with the object), expected presence (expected
presence of an object in a particular context), difficulty imagining the
object in isolation, and object-to-object associations (any additional ob-
jects that come to mind when thinking about this object).
Primary fMRI experiment
Participants. A new group of 21 healthy, right-handed, native English
speakers, who had not taken part in any of the behavioral studies, partic-
ipated in this fMRI experiment (8 females; mean age, 24.9 years; StD,
4.0). All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and nor-
mal hearing and gave informed written consent in accordance with the
local research ethics committee. Participants were unaware of the SD/SA
distinction. Their naivety was critical to ensure an unbiased assessment
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of the neural basis of SD and SA objects. Thus, participants merely imag-
ined (or viewed; see below, Auxiliary fMRI experiment) single objects
during scanning, while unbeknownst to them, the objects had been con-
sistently agreed by participants in the previous behavioral studies to be
SD or SA.
Stimuli and procedure. Participants performed 350 trials in 5 scanning
sessions of 10.5 min each, with a 2 min gap between each session
during which the participant spoke with the experimenter (see below,
Debriefing). Each session began with an explicit instruction to clear their
imagination and to close their eyes (Fig. 1). The 250 objects from the
behavioral studies described above (plus 50 background items—walls,
floors) and 50 control jargon phrases (e.g., “a program question”) (Sum-
merfield et al., 2010) were presented auditorily to participants one at a
time. Each item was presented only once during the experiment, and the
order of conditions was randomized. Note that our main interest was in
SD and SA objects; therefore, specific analyses relating to background
items and control jargon phrases are not reported here (and did not
involve activation of PHC).
Before scanning, participants received extensive training to ensure
they fully understood the task requirements. In particular, participants
were trained to clear their minds between each trial and to imagine each
item devoid of any context. This latter point was emphasized throughout
the training session, and participants did not proceed to the fMRI study
until the experimenter was confident that they were imagining the prac-
tice items in isolation and devoid of any context. To ensure that this was
not forgotten and to reinforce the importance of this requirement, par-
ticipants were asked to rate how successful they felt they were at adhering
to this instruction after each scan session (1 very successful, 2mostly
successful, 3 fairly successful, 4 not that successful, 5 not at all
successful). Participants’ mean score on this rating was 2.56 (StD 0.3),
showing they were successful at adhering to this instruction. In addi-
tion, participants were instructed to imagine each stimulus at a dis-
tance of 1 m.
Visualization trials. After participants cleared their minds and closed
their eyes, they were then required to visualize the object whose descrip-
tion they heard, in isolation and devoid of surrounding items or addi-
tional background contexts. The auditory item descriptions lasted2 s
(SD: mean, 2.11; StD, 0.30; range, 1.41–3.43; SA: mean, 2.10; StD, 0.34;
range, 1.44–3.59; unsure: mean, 2.23; StD, 0.36; range, 1.75–2.84; back-
grounds: mean, 2.10; StD, 0.26; range, 1.46–2.78), and this was followed
by a 3 s visualization period. It was emphasized that during this time they
were not permitted to visualize any other items
(other thanwhat had been explicitly described)
or to think of memories of similar items that
had previously been encountered or other
items that may be associated with the item be-
ing imagined. As discussed previously, each
object and background item was accompanied
by one or twodescriptors (e.g., colors, patterns,
material). These were balanced across SD and
SA objects. A “next trial” auditory cue signaled
the end of the visualization period. Following a
jittered gap of 2, 2.5, or 3 s, a new trial
commenced.
Control trials. Control trials proceeded in the same way, but with par-
ticipants hearing short jargon phrases (mean duration, 1.87; StD, 0.31;
range, 1.26–2.40). Participants were instructed to attend to these phrases
but not to visualize any related images or to recall any memories asso-
ciated with the phrase content. Each jargon phrase was presented only
once during the experiment.
Catch trials. To ensure that attention was maintained throughout the
experiment, participants were informed they might be asked whether a
certain word had been spoken during the preceding trial. This occurred
on 10% of trials (including objects, backgrounds, and control trials). A
catch trial was indicated by a different auditory cue (signaling to partic-
ipants to open their eyes) in place of the next trial auditory cue. Partici-
pants were visually presented with one descriptor word (e.g., “black”).
Their task was simply to decide whether this word was used in the previ-
ous object description (e.g., “a black leather sofa”; response yes). Re-
sponses were recorded using an fMRI-compatible keypad. Participants
had a maximum of 5 s to respond, after which they were instructed to
close their eyes. The next trial audio signal was then played and the
successive trial proceeded as normal. Catch trials never occurred on two
successive trials and were excluded from any subsequent analysis.
Debriefing. Immediately following scanning, participants were de-
briefed and asked to rate each of the items that were presented during
scanning with respect to difficulty imagining each item (from 1 to 5,
low-high) and vividness (from 1 to 5, not at all vivid-very vivid) of the
imagined image. The experimenter then discussed overall task perfor-
mance with participants and asked them to rate (from 1 to 5, low to high)
aspects of the tasks in general, such as howdifficult it had been to imagine
the items in isolation (and against a blank background) and how fre-
quently personal memories/other objects/backgrounds/structures came
to mind when performing the task.
Scanning parameters and preprocessing. T2*-weighted echo planar im-
ages (EPI) with blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) contrast were
acquired on a 1.5 tesla Siemens Sonata MRI scanner. Scanning parame-
ters were selected to achieve whole brain coverage: 45 oblique axial slices
angled at 30° in the anterior–posterior axis; 2 mm thickness (1 mm gap);
repetition time, 4.05 s; slice time, 90ms; TE, 50ms; field of view, 192mm;
64  64 matrix; in-plane resolution; 3  3 mm. The first six “dummy”
volumes from each session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration
effects. Field maps were acquired with a standard manufacturer’s double
echo gradient echo field map sequence (short TE  10 ms; long TE 
Figure 1. Task design. Timeline of an example SD trial. See Materials and Methods for full details.
Table 1. Mean ratings for object parameters
Description Measure SD objects SA objects
Behavioral studies
Size Imagined object size (1) Very small . . . (5) very large 3.61 (0.50) 2.16 (0.51) † *
Portability Imagined object movement (1) Often moves . . . (5) rarely moves 4.56 (0.61) 2.95 (0.95) † *
Object-to-context associations Place most strongly associated with the object Consistency across participants (%) 65.12 (22.45) 55.27 (22.87) † *
Expected presence Expected presence of an object in the associated context (1) No, not often . . . (5) always 2.73 (0.69) 2.92 (0.79) NS
Isolation Difficulty imagining the object in isolation (1) Very easy . . . (5) very difficult 1.97 (0.42) 1.86 (0.52) NS
Object-to-object associations Any additional object(s) that automatically come(s) to mind Consistency across participants (%) 64.37 (16.48) 60.48 (21.4) NS
Post-scan debriefing
Difficulty Difficulty imagining the object (1) Very difficult . . . (5) very easy 3.56 (0.45) 3.79 (0.44) ‡ *
Vividness Vividness of the imagined object (1) Not at all vivid(5) very vivid 3.42 (0.55) 3.66 (0.56) ‡ *
Standard deviations in parentheses. †Significantly more for SD than SA; ‡significantly more for SA than SD (*p 0.001).
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14.76 ms; whole brain coverage; voxel size, 3  3  3 mm). A T1-
weighted structural scan was acquired for each participant with 1 mm
isotropic resolution. Data were analyzed using the statistical parametric
mapping software SPM5 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Spatial prepro-
cessing consisted of realignment and unwarping (using field maps), nor-
malization to a standard EPI template inMontreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) space with a resampled voxel size of 3 3 3 mm, and smooth-
ing using a Gaussian kernel with full width at half maximum of 8 mm.
fMRI data analysis. After preprocessing, statistical analysis was per-
formed using the general linear model. The experiment had three main
“visualizing” conditions (space-defining, space-ambiguous, and back-
ground items) and one baseline control (jargon) condition.Wemodeled
the time period from the start of the item description until the end of the
gap (jitter) period (see Fig. 1) as a boxcar function of9 s duration (exact
durations were calculated on a per trial basis given the differences in
stimulus durations and the jittered gap). We modeled this time period
based on participants’ comments in the debriefing session. Many partic-
ipants reported that they continued to hold a clear image of the imagined
object in their minds eye until the next trial cue, which initiated the start
of the new trial, was heard. This was convolved with the canonical he-
modynamic response function to create regressors of interest.
Subject-specificmovement parameters were included as regressors of no
interest. Subject-specific parameter estimates pertaining to each regres-
sor (betas) were calculated for each voxel. Second level random effects
analyses were then run using one-sample t tests on these parameter esti-
mates (collapsed across sessions). We report the fMRI results at a
voxel-level threshold of p 0.001, whole brain uncorrected (minimum
cluster size of 5 voxels). We show all areas activated at this threshold. All
activations are displayed on sections of the average structural MR image
of all the participants. Reported voxels conform to MNI coordinate
space. Right side of the brain is displayed on the right side.
Auxiliary fMRI experiment
While our main interest was in the imagination paradigm, we also con-
ducted an additional fMRI study using pictures of real objects to verify
that the SD/SA effect was not limited to the imagination protocol. In so
doing we also took the opportunity to examine whether SD/SA effects
were similar for indoor and outdoor objects. As in the imagination par-
adigm, a behavioral experiment was conducted before the fMRI study to
select a set of stimuli categorized in terms of SD/SA.
Behavioral study. A group of 10 healthy, right-handed, native English
speakers who had not been involved in any of the previous experiments
participated (2 males; mean age, 25.3 years; StD, 4.3 years). All partici-
pants had normal or corrected to normal vision and normal hearing and
gave informed written consent in accordance with the local research
ethics committee. Using instructions identical to those described above
(see above, Behavioral experiments), participants were first asked to rate
452 single objects in terms of SD and SA. Here, however, participants
viewed two-dimensional pictures of the stimuli rather than imagining
each object in their mind’s eye. Objects were presented one at a time on a
computer screen on a plainwhite background. The ratings were scored as
in the imagination studies. The SD/SA distinction was readily made for
pictures of both indoor and outdoor objects. Two hundred and eighty-
eight objects (consistently rated across subjects—144 SD objects: 96 in-
door and 48 outdoor; 144 SA objects: 96 indoor and 48 outdoor) were
selected to include in the fMRI component of this study.
In the second phase of this behavioral study, participants also rated
each of the 177 stimuli used by Bar and Aminoff (2003) (obtained online
from http://barlab.mgh.harvard.edu/ContextLocalizer.htm) as SD or
SA. These ratings were scored as described previously.
fMRI study. A new group of 6 healthy right-handed native English
speakers, who were unaware of the SD/SA distinction and had not taken
part in the previous behavioral studies, participated in this fMRI study (5
male;mean age, 27.83 years; StD, 2.86 years). All participants had normal
or corrected to normal vision and normal hearing and gave informed
written consent in accordance with the local research ethics committee.
Stimuli were visually presented in blocks with 6 stimuli per block (stim-
ulus duration, 3000ms; interstimulus interval, 750ms), and there were 4
experimental conditions of interest (SD indoor objects, SA indoor ob-
jects, SD outdoor objects, SA outdoor objects). In total, participants
viewed 16 blocks of SD indoor objects and 16 blocks of SA indoor objects,
8 blocks of SD outdoor objects, and 8 blocks of SA outdoor objects. Ten
blocks of scrambled images were also presented (scrambled using a 20
20 grid in Adobe Photoshop C52). Blocks were presented in pseudo-
random order with no two SD or SA blocks presented consecutively, and
session order was counterbalanced across participants (there were two
sessions). To ensure attention, participants had to perform a 1-back task
throughout. There were four 1-back matches within each session, one
match per condition (with the exception of the scrambled condition),
which were subsequently excluded from the fMRI analysis. Scanning
parameters, data preprocessing details, and statistical thresholds were
identical to those described in the first fMRI study.
The experiment had two main conditions (SD and SA) each with two
levels (indoor and outdoor) and one baseline (scrambled) condition.We
modeled the time period from the start to the end of each block as a
boxcar function of22.5 s duration. This was convolvedwith the canon-
ical hemodynamic response function to create regressors of interest.
Subject-specific movement parameters were included as regressors of no
interest. Subject-specific parameter estimates pertaining to each regres-
sor (betas) were calculated for each voxel. Second level random effects
analyses were then run using one-sample t tests on these parameter
estimates (collapsed across sessions). Our main interests were in the
direct comparisons between SD and SA objects (SD  SA), and be-
tween SDindoor  SAindoor and SDoutdoor  SAoutdoor objects.
Results
Primary fMRI study
The results of the behavioral experiments confirmed the validity
of the SD/SA concept. Participants were able to categorize a large
group of single objects using the criterion of awareness of the
surrounding space, a characteristic that appears to encompass
parameters such as object size and portability (see Materials and
Methods and Table 1). Evoking a sense of the surrounding space
is, however, a characteristic more traditionally attributed to
scenes rather than single objects. We propose that SD objects are
more similar to scenes than to SA objects when considered along
this dimension. The aim of the next experiment was to assess,
using fMRI, the brain areas associated with space-defining and
space-ambiguous objects. We hypothesized that SD objects
would activate scene-specialized brain areas such as PHC more
than SA objects.
Behavioral data
Catch trials. Catch trials were performed during scanning. Partic-
ipants performed with a high level of accuracy (mean, 97.7%;
StD, 2.7; range, 92–100), showing theymaintained attention dur-
ing the experiment. These trials were subsequently removed from
the fMRI analysis.
Post-scan debriefing. Immediately following scanning, partic-
ipants were asked to rate each of the items that were presented
during scanning with respect to how difficult it was to imagine
and the vividness of the imagined image.Mean per-object ratings
for these two measures are shown in Table 1. These two ratings
were used in the subsequent fMRI analysis, along with those ob-
tained in the previous behavioral experiments (also shown on
Table 1). Overall, SA objects were rated as significantly easier to
imagine (t(235)4.06; p 0.001) and significantly more vivid
(t(235)4; p 0.001) than SD objects.
In addition, participants were also asked tomake some ratings
not on a per-object basis but in terms of the overall experiment.
These were not included in the fMRI analysis. Overall, partici-
pants found it relatively easy to imagine the objects in isolation
against a blank background (1 very easy . . . 5 very difficult;
mean, 2.76; StD, 0.68), felt they were able to imagine the items
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without the addition of extra objects/background/structures
(1  kept to the description . . . 5  added lots of extra detail;
mean, 2.19; StD, 0.60), avoided personal memories (1 
never . . . 5  very frequently; mean, 2.29; StD, 1.01), and were
able to concentrate well throughout the imagining sessions (1
not focused at all . . . 5 very focused; mean, 3.76; StD, 0.64).
fMRI data
Direct comparisons between SD and SA objects. Our main interest
was in those brain areas that were selectively engagedwhen space-
defining items were imagined. We directly contrasted space-
defining objects with space-ambiguous objects (SD  SA) and
observed activity in left PHC (27,42,12, Z 4.20, cluster
size 61), right PHC (33,39,12,Z 4.54, cluster size 74),
left middle frontal gyrus (51, 33, 12, Z  4.06, cluster size 
31), and right cerebellum (6,57,24, Z 3.94, cluster size
60 (Fig. 2). In a separate parametric analysis we defined an SD
regressor using the cumulative space-defining ratings for each
object, and activity linearly modulated by ratings that were in-
creasingly space defining was identified (Wood et al., 2008). Sim-
ilar results pertained when the data were modeled categorically
(the data described here and in Fig. 2) or parametrically. In both
models, the activity observed within PHC was in a region often
referred to as the “parahippocampal place area” (PPA) (Epstein
and Kanwisher, 1998). By contrast, the left lingual gyrus (18,
78, 6, Z  4.55, cluster size  22), right superior temporal
sulcus (66, 30, 6, Z  3.43, cluster size  12), right superior
frontal gyrus (6, 33, 48, Z  4.13, cluster size  10), left mid-
cingulate cortex (12,45, 30, Z 3.25, cluster size 10), and
left precuneus (3,66, 39, Z 3.29, cluster size 7) showed
increased activity for SA objects compared with SD objects. Note
that when only those objects that were rated as very easy/easy to
imagine in isolation and so definitively devoid of filling in of
background/spatial layout (94 SDobjects and 99 SAobjects) were
used in the fMRI analysis, again robust bilateral activation of
PHC was apparent (left PHC: 30, 42, 9, Z  4.30, cluster
size 41; right PHC: 30,36,18, Z 3.70, cluster size 24).
Contextual association hypothesis. It has been suggested that
the PHC is specifically involved in the mediation of contextual
associative processing (Bar, 2004). Could the SD-related PHC
activity be accounted for by how contextualized the objects were,
rather than in terms of how strongly they evoke an awareness of
surrounding space?We addressed this issue in a number of ways.
First, using the previously obtainedmeasure of object-to-context
associations (seeMaterials andMethods), we categorized the ob-
ject stimuli as being either highly (114 objects) or weakly (95
objects) contextualized. By performing a categorical comparison
between these two categories, we identified brain regions that
responded to highly contextualized versus weakly contextualized
objects. Greater activity was observed in
left and right angular gyrus (45, 72,
30, Z  3.42, cluster size  16; 42, 78,
27, Z 3.69, cluster size 6; 39,66, 30,
Z 5.54, cluster size 6), left precuneus
(12, 69, 45, Z  3.71, cluster size 
10), right inferior frontal gyrus (51, 6, 3,
Z  3.86, cluster size  8), and left and
right cerebellum (3, 72, 21, Z 
3.73, cluster size 7;18,60,27,Z
3.60, cluster size  8; 33, 42, 39, Z 
3.49, cluster size8; 9,63,18,Z3.45,
cluster size  5) for highly contextualized
objects; however, no activity changes in
PHC were observed. To include all object
stimuli in the analysis (and not simply the two extremes sampled in
the “highly” and “weakly” contextualized object groups), we per-
formed an additional parametric analysis using the cumulative
“object-to-context associations” ratings for eachobject as a regressor
of interest in the GLM. This revealed very similar regions of activity,
and again no changes in PHC.
We thus failed to find evidence in support of the contextual
association hypothesis. However, to ensure that we had thor-
oughly explored the data, we performed two additional analyses
that sought to distinguish between activity modulated by linearly
increasing levels of contextual associations from that attributable
to the effect of SD (analysis 1), and activity linearly modulated by
increasing SD independent of the effect of increasing contextual
association (analysis 2). Thus, both the CA and SD scores were
entered as regressors of interest in aGLM, and the second of these
regressors was orthogonalized to the first (i.e., in analysis 1 CA
was orthogonalized to SD and in analysis 2 SD was orthogonal-
ized to CA). This allowed the linear effect of increasing levels of a
second orthogonalized regressor (i.e., CA in analysis 1 and SD in
analysis 2) to be observed independent of the first regressor. No
activity was observed in PHC for the independent component of
the CA regressor (relative to SD) (Table 2), supporting our initial
categorical and parametric CA analyses, which suggested that
activity in the PHC was not evoked in response to highly as op-
posed to weakly contextualized objects. By contrast, the linear
effect of increasing SD independent of CA (i.e., analysis 2) re-
sulted in persistent activity in PHC bilaterally (Table 2) in re-
sponse to this independent component of the SD regressor,
suggesting that the effect in this region is driven by SD and not by
contextual associations.
One possible explanation for the disparity between our find-
ings and those of Bar and Aminoff (2003) is that their previous
“highly contextualized” stimulus setmay have contained a higher
proportion of SD objects than the corresponding “weakly con-
textualized” set. We thus performed an additional behavioral
study (see Material and Methods) where an independent group
of participants made SD/SA ratings for each of the 177 stimuli
used by Bar and Aminoff (2003). A significantly greater propor-
tion of their highly contextualized stimulus set was rated as being
SD in comparison to the proportion of stimuli considered to be
SD in the weakly contextualized stimuli set: t(9) 4.565, p 0.01
(Fig. 3).
The above analyses strengthen our original conclusion that
the PHC responds robustly to the imagination of SD relative to
SA objects, and this response is evident even when variance
attributable to how contextualized the individual stimuli are is
accounted for. Moreover, we found no evidence to suggest
that contextual associations underpin the activity changes in
Figure2. Brain areas engaged by imagining SD relative to SA objects. Brain areasmore active for SD compared to SA objects are
displayed (left) on a sagittal image from a “glass brain” that enables one to appreciate activations at all locations and levels in the
brain simultaneously. Activations at the level of the peak left PHC voxel are shown on sagittal (middle) and coronal (right) images
from the averaged structural MRI scan of the 21 subjects at a threshold of p 0.001 (whole brain, uncorrected). The color bar
indicates the Z-scores associated with each voxel. L, Left side of the brain.
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the PHC and suggest instead that previous data supporting the
CA hypothesis (e.g., Bar and Aminoff, 2003) was conflated
with the effect of SD.
Factor analysis. Above, we examined the effects of SD that are
independent of contextual associations but did not consider the
influence of other potential variables on the SD effect. In total, we
gathered data across nine separate dimensions for each object:
SD/SA, object size, object portability, difficulty imagining the
object, the vividness of the imagined object, difficulty imagining
the object in isolation, object-to-object associations, object-to-
context associations, and expected presence of the object in an
associated context (see Table 1). As some of these variables may
potentially tap into the same underlying components, the scores
on the nine parameters were submitted to principal components
factor analysis. A varimax rotation was used to derive orthogonal
factor scores with an eigenvalue of above 0.75. A total of four
significant orthogonal factors were extracted that accounted for
83.86% of the variance in the data (Table 3). Uncorrelated factor
score coefficients were estimated for each of the factors using the
Anderson–Rubinmethod, and thesewere entered as regressors of
interest in a GLM fMRI analysis.
SD ratings, object size, and object portability loaded strongly
onto the first factor, and this factor accounted for 29.01% of the
variance in the data (Table 3). The clustering of object size and
portability with SD suggests these components are highly rele-
vant to the SD concept. Interestingly, the brain regions modu-
lated by this factor were remarkably similarly to those engaged by
SD SA (left PHC:24,42,12, Z 4.56,30,30,21,
Z 3.24, cluster size 64; right PHC: 30,36,15, Z 4.70,
cluster size 58; left middle frontal gyrus:51, 33, 12, Z 4.90,
48, 36, 21, Z 3.50, cluster size 31; left lateral occipital area:
51,51,12, Z 3.38, cluster size 16; right lateral occipital
area: 51,54,12,Z 4.76, cluster size 9) (Fig. 4A). PHCwas
not modulated by any of the other three factors, including those
that comprised the context parameters.
Given the strong relationship between SD, object size, and
portability suggested by the factor analysis, we conducted a sec-
ond factor analysis omitting the SD parameter and submitted the
scores on the remaining eight parameters to a principal compo-
nents factor analysis using the same technique as before. A total of
four significant orthogonal factors were extracted that accounted
for 83.65% of the variance in the data, suggesting that the addi-
tion of the SD parameter in the previous factor analysis had not
resulted in greater explanatory power. Moreover, despite the ex-
clusion of our SD parameter, object size and object portability
both loaded onto the same discrete factor while ratings of object
vividness and difficulty loaded together, as did difficulty imagin-
ing the object in isolation and object-to-object associations and
object-to-context and expected presence. Finally, when the esti-
mated uncorrelated factor score coefficients were entered as re-
gressors of interest in a GLM, the brain regions modulated by the
“object size and portability” factor were remarkably similarly to
those modulated by both the SD SA effect, and the “SD, object
size, and object portability” factor from the first factor analysis
(left PHC:24,42,12,Z 4.73, cluster size 67; right PHC:
30,36,15, Z 4.34, 30,33,24, Z 3.55, cluster size
58; left middle frontal gyrus:51, 33, 15, Z 4.69,45, 39, 24,
Table 2. Brain areas modulated by increasing SD or contextual associations
Region Peak coordinates (x, y, z) Z
Linear effect of increasing CA (independent of SD)
Left cerebellum 18,57,30 4.04
6,72,21 3.97 31
12,63,24 3.34
Left cerebellum 12,81,42 3.60 5
Left insula 39, 3, 15 3.94 13
Linear effect of increasing SD (independent of CA)
Right parahippocampal cortex 33,39,12 4.41 49
Left parahippocampal cortex 24,42,12 4.15 36
Left middle frontal gyrus 48, 30, 12 4.41 31
Right lateral occipital area 51,54,12 3.82 7
Left precentral sulcus 33,3, 51 3.42 5
Figure 3. An analysis of Bar and Aminoff’s (2003) stimuli in terms of SD/SA. Participants in
one of our experiments rated a significantly larger proportion of objects as space defining in Bar
and Aminoff’s (2003) “highly contextualized” set of stimuli in comparison to their “weakly
contextualized” set of objects. **p 0.01.
Table 3. Results of the principal components factor analysis
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Variance (%)
SD ratings 0.947 0.114 0.009 0.029 29.01
Size 0.932 0.074 0.036 0.041
Portability 0.841 0.237 0.167 0.019
Difficulty 0.181 0.938 0.193 0.081 23.32
Vividness 0.163 0.941 0.159 0.052
Isolation 0.093 0.340 0.810 0.129 18.05
Object-to-object associations 0.063 0.040 0.925 0.069
Object-to-context associations 0.208 0.135 0.132 0.824 13.48
Expected presence 0.153 0.351 0.051 0.708
Total;83.86
Boldface indicates each variable’s highest factor loading.
Figure 4. The brain areas engaged by the four factors extracted in the principal component
analysis. A, Shown are the brain areas engaged by the linear effect of the “SD, size, and porta-
bility” factor extracted in first factor analysis and displayed at the peak voxel in left PHC. B,
Shown are the brain areas engaged by the linear effect of “size and portability” factor (i.e.,
excluding SD) extracted in second factor analysis anddisplayed at thepeak voxel in left PHC. The
activations are shownon the relevant axial sections fromtheaveraged structuralMRI scanof the
21 subjects at a threshold of p 0.001 (whole brain, uncorrected). The color bar indicates the
Z-scores associated with each voxel. L, Left side of the brain.
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Z 3.58, cluster size 31; left lateral occipital area:51,51,
12, Z 3.74, cluster size 15) (Fig. 4B). Thus, the combina-
tion of object size and portability appeared sufficient to produce
robust and remarkably consistent activations in PHC.
Looking back to the behavioral studies (see Material and
Methods and Table 1), it was apparent that SD objects were on
average larger than SA objects, although there was a good deal of
overlap in the medium size range for both object types, suggest-
ing that size alone was not the cause of the SD effect. On average,
SD objects were less portable, but again a considerable number of
SA objects had low portability also, suggesting portability alone
was not the basis of the SD effect. However, the results of the
factor analyses suggest that it may be the combination of larger
size and low portability that gives rise to the SD effect. The tightly
coupled relationship between size and portability is confirmed in
Figure 5, where increasing SD correlated with size ratings (r 
0.87, p 0.001) and with ratings of object portability (r 0.76,
p  0.001), while size and portability were correlated with one
another (r 0.70, p 0.001).
Auxiliary fMRI experiment
Finally, to verify that the SD effect in PHCwas notmerely specific
to our imagination methodology, we conducted an additional
fMRI study to validate the effect of SD within PHC using a more
classical visual paradigm (see Materials and Methods). In these
studies we also included indoor and outdoor objects to assess
whether the SD effect pertained to both.
Examination of our original imagined objects fMRI data (Fig.
2) showed that the SD SA effect in PHCwas remarkably robust
even at the level of single subjects. Therefore, in this new fMRI
study six participants viewed the object pictures. They had no
knowledge of the SD/SA distinction but were occupied instead
with performing a 1-back task [in line with similar paradigms in
the object processing literature, e.g., Epstein and Kanwisher
(1998) and Epstein and Ward (2010)]. Just as with the imagina-
tion study, the SD SA effect for viewed objects was apparent in
PHC at the same statistical thresholds as applied in the imagina-
tion study (p  0.001 uncorrected) (left PHC: 27, 39, 12,
Z  4.72; 24, 42, 9, Z  4.28; 15, 39, 27, Z  3.90,
cluster size  103; right PHC: 30, 48, 9, Z  4.40, cluster
size  30) (Fig. 6, red activations). Moreover, the effects were
focal, robust, and evident in each one of the 6 subjects. There was
remarkable overlap between PHC activations for the imagined
objects (Fig. 6, blue activations) and the viewed objects (Fig. 6,
red activations), confirming the SD effect in PHC regardless
of presentation mode. Finally, when the
viewed objects were split into indoor and
outdoor objects, the SD  SA effect in
PHC was clearly evident for both con-
trasts, i.e., SDindoor SAindoor objects (left
PHC: 30, 33, 12, Z  4.48; 33,
42,12, Z 3.79;24,33,18, Z
3.54, cluster size  29) and SDoutdoor 
SAoutdoor objects (left PHC: 24, 54,
3, Z  3.72; 24, 42, 12, Z  22,
cluster size 22).
Discussion
By introducing the concept of space-
defining and space-ambiguous single
objects, we sought to divorce the basic
awareness of local space from scene stim-
uli and their typical multicomponent
structures. To do this, we used single ob-
jects categorized according to whether or not they elicited an
awareness of surrounding space while ensuring that this did not
include spatial layout or context. The results of the behavioral
studies demonstrated that participants were capable of distin-
guishing between SD and SA objects. This distinction was subse-
quently affirmed at the neural level, where both the imagination
and the viewing of single SD objects (indoor and outdoor)
evoked activitywithin brain regions classically associatedwith the
perception or imagination of full scenes (Epstein and Kanwisher,
1998; Aguirre and D’Esposito, 1999; O’Craven and Kanwisher,
2000; Maguire et al., 2001; Mendez and Cherrier, 2003; Hassabis
et al., 2007; Park andChun, 2009). This PHC responsewas robust
and was not accounted for by a range of other potential explan-
atory factors such as contextual associations (Bar and Aminoff,
2003; Bar, 2004).Overall, this set of behavioral andneuroimaging
experiments validate and characterize this novel concept of
SD/SA and suggest that the awareness of local 3D space may be a
fundamental concern of the PHC.
Why is it necessary to respecify the role of the parahippocam-
pal cortex in terms of the awareness of surrounding space, given
that the PHC is already associated with processing of 3D geomet-
ric spatial layout (Epstein, 2008)? A central tenet of the spatial
layout hypothesis purports that geometric spatial layout is de-
rived from fixed elements, and this is absent in single objects
Figure 5. SD, object size, and object portability. Increasing “SD” correlated with both size
ratings (very small . . . very large) and object portability. Size and portability also correlated
with one another. It is clear that the upper right quadrant contains many more SD objects,
suggesting that a combination of larger size and less portability are intimately involved in the
SD effect.
Figure6. Brain areas engaged by viewing pictures of SD relative to SA objects. Brain areasmore active for SD comparedwith SA
objects (collapsed across indoor and outdoor objects) in the “viewing” paradigm are shown in red on relevant axial and sagittal
sections on the averaged structuralMRI scan of the six subjects. The activations previously observed for the SD SA contrast in the
“imagination paradigm (see Fig. 2) are displayed in blue, illustrating the overlap in the location of the activations between the two
different presentationmodes. All activations are shown at a threshold of p 0.001 (whole brain, uncorrected). L, Left side of the
brain.
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(Epstein andKanwisher, 1998; Epstein et al., 1999). Furthermore,
while the PHC or “parahippocampal place area” as it is often
called, is believed to respond to the geometry engendered by these
elements, it remains unclear what it is about the geometric layout
of a scene that the PHC actually responds to (for more on this
problem, see Epstein, 2008). Here, we propose a more refined
account of PHC function that suggests the PHCactually responds
to the basic sense of three-dimensional space, necessarily present
in scenes, but also inherently linked to some single object stimuli
(i.e., space-defining objects). We propose that SD objects are
unique in that they possess this spatial dimension while being
independent of the typical multicomponent structure of scenes.
A significant aspect of our experiments was that participants
were explicitly trained to imagine the individual objects in the
absence of spatial layout or a larger scene context, and extensive
efforts were made to ensure that participants continued to com-
ply with this task instruction throughout the experiment. Feed-
back from the debriefing sessions, i.e., ratings from the behavioral
experiments during and after the scanning sessions, confirmed
that participants found it easy to imagine the objects in isolation
(with no difference between SD and SA objects), felt themselves
to be successful at doing so, and rarely included extra objects/
background/structures. Moreover, when we performed an fMRI
analysis comparing only the “easily imagined in isolation SD ob-
jects”with the “easily imagined in isolation SAobjects,” as before,
we found striking and robust bilateral parahippocampal cortex
activations associated with SD compared with SA objects. Thus,
when we refined our analysis to include only those objects easily
visualized as singular isolated entities, we fully replicated our
PHC finding. Thus, we can conclude with some confidence that
the PHC responds robustly to single SD object stimuli and there-
fore to objects that evoke an awareness of surrounding space.
Significantly, object stimuli in previous experiments have almost
invariably been SA objects. No study has performed a truly un-
confounded “scene  SD object” comparison, and we would
predict that any differential signal change between these stimulus
categories would be a function of the amount of surrounding
space evoked by individual stimuli. Thus, the concept of SD pro-
vides a more direct and concrete account of PHC function and
removes the necessity to present whole scenes or places in stimuli
that are difficult to decompose into their component parts. One
could sum this up by suggesting that the parahippocampal place
area might more accurately be referred to as the parahippocam-
pal “space” area.
An obvious question that emerges from our findings is “what
gives rise to the SD effect?” Our data offer some insight into this
issue. The factor analyses showed that SD, object size, and object
portability loaded onto the same factor, and the uncorrelated
factor score coefficients were associated with robust PHC activa-
tion. Notably, when SD was omitted from the factor analysis,
object size and portability again loaded together on the same
factor, accounted for the same amount of experimental variance
as the first factor analysis, and the uncorrelated factor score co-
efficients were associated with the same robust PHC activation.
This strongly suggests that the PHC activations were driven by a
combination of object size andportability. Examination of Figure
5 confirms that substantially more SD compared with SA objects
were both larger and less portable. Thus, it seems likely that the
SD effect, that is, where an object evokes a sense of surrounding
space in the absence of spatial layout or context, is a consequence
of object size and portability, and this is instantiated at the neural
level in the PHC. SD objects anchor themselves in space, and the
PHC response to SD objects is therefore biologically useful be-
cause such objects are likely to have greater permanency and
ultimately more utility in coding a space.
While our results strongly suggest the SD and PHC effect
arises from a combination of object size and portability, our data
also show that the PHCwas not explicable in terms of contextual
associations. As discussed previously, the contextual association
hypothesis proposes that the PHC is engaged by the activation of
previously acquired representations that link specific stimuli with
particular (spatial or nonspatial) contexts (Bar and Aminoff,
2003; Bar et al., 2008). By categorizing our stimuli into those
strongly associated with specific contexts (object-to-context as-
sociations), strongly and weakly contextualized objects could be
directly compared. No evidence was found that the PHC was
engaged by the processing of these contextualized stimuli or by
the component of the CA regressor that was independent of SD.
Similarly, other aspects of contextual processing (“expected pres-
ence in the associated context,” “object-to-object associations,”
or “difficulty imaging the objects in isolation”) also failed to ac-
tivate the PHC. The factor analyses further confirmed that con-
textual parameters did not load onto the same factor as SD and,
moreover, the factors ontowhich they loadedwere not associated
with PHC activation. Finally, when the SD regressor was exam-
inedwith the effects of CApartialed out, the PHC effect remained
robust.
Interestingly, several other studies have also failed to replicate
the contextual association effect (Henderson et al., 2008; Epstein
andWard, 2010).Our data suggest a reasonwhyBar andAminoff
(2003) may have observed a PHC response to highly contextual-
ized objects. We strongly suspected that there may have been an
over-representation of SD objects in their highly contextualized
category and an over-representation of SA objects in the weakly
contextualized category within their stimulus set. We confirmed
this bias (Fig. 3) in our behavioral study where participants rated
the Bar and Aminoff (2003) stimuli in terms of our SD/SA cate-
gorization. The overrepresentation of SD objects in Bar andAmi-
noff’s “highly contextualized” stimuli relative to their “weakly
contextualized” stimuli set suggests their previous high/weak
contextualization manipulations were confounded by SD.
In conclusion, our findings add to the growing body of liter-
ature about the function of the parahippocampal cortex. Show-
ing that some single objects define the space around them, and
that the PHC is responsive to this awareness of surrounding local
space, suggests that the role for PHC in scene processing is basic
and fundamental, such that it is not dependent onmore complex
scene properties such as geometric structure (Epstein, 2008),
scene schema (Mandler and Parker, 1976; Biederman et al., 1982;
Bar and Ullman, 1996) or contextual associations (Bar and Ami-
noff, 2003; Bar, 2004; Bar et al., 2008). This implies that the spatial
layout hypothesis (Epstein, 2008; Epstein andWard, 2010)might
be refined by accounting for our findings and, in doing so, this
could help to overcome its current difficulties in defining exactly
what it is about scenes that evokes a PHC response. Future studies
are needed to examine whether and under what circumstances
objects can become space defining and how the SD effect relates
to other processes such as those concerning the navigational rel-
evance of objects/landmarks (Janzen and van Turennout, 2004).
How the SD-related PHC response interacts with other brain
areas like the retrosplenial cortex (Vann et al., 2009) and regions
concerned with scene construction such as the hippocampus
(Hassabis andMaguire, 2007, 2009) will also need to be clarified.
In the meantime, our findings underline the need for care in the
design of future studies involving objects and scenes to ensure
that the powerful SD effect in PHC is not misinterpreted.
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